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I. INTRODUCTION

In conjunction with a broad investigation of possible Medicare and
Medicaid fraud by a large health care provider, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") discovered that the provider in question had conducted internal audits
of its patient records.' When the DOJ requested to obtain the audits, the provider denied the request based on the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine.2 Ultimately, settlement negotiations resulted in the production
of some of the audits. 3 Private payors then sued the provider to recover sums
that they alleged were over-billed by the provider.4 To support their case, the
private payors sought to obtain the audits in discovery, contending that any
privilege associated with them was waived once the audits had been disclosed to
the government.5 A federal appellate court was left to decide this complex issue
at the intersection of the competing interests of promoting cooperation with a
government investigation and preserving a time-honored right.
The attorney-client privilege is a bedrock principle of the American legal system. Such privilege is intended to facilitate openness between attorney
and client in the context of legal representation.6 Furthermore, even the general

I See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 291-92
(6th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed sub nom. HCA, Inc. v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund,
124 S. Ct. 27 (2003).
2

See id. at 292.

3

See id.

4

See id. at 293.

5

See id.

6

See JOHN W. GERGACZ, ATTORNEY CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.02, at 1-4 (2d ed.

1990).
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public, armed with legal knowledge derived from prime-time television, understands the basic tenets of the attorney-client privilege. Indeed, the issue of attorney-client privilege with regard to document disclosure arises frequently in
civil litigation.7
Generally, any disclosure outside the attorney-client relationship waives
the privilege because a third party is under no obligation to maintain confidentiality. 8 As the above example demonstrates, an interesting matter arises with the
disclosure of documents in conjunction with an investigation of a corporation by
a government agency such as the DOJ or the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Whether the disclosure of documents in the course of a government investigation constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege is a difficult question.
Predictably, courts are divided on this issue. Some have found that
turning over privileged materials to government investigators does not waive the
attorney-client privilege. 9 In so finding, these courts have recognized a parallel
interest of promoting efficiency in the administration of justice. Other courts,
adhering to a stricter interpretation of the privilege doctrine, have found that
such surrender of materials renders the privilege waived.' 0 Thus, a split in the
federal circuits has emerged. As it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari to decide this issue given its heavy docket," a legislative remedy is the
logical alternative for resolving the split.
7

See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT

DOCTRINE 1 (4th ed. 2001).
8
See generally Margaret A. Carfagno, Note, Settlement Situations and the Maintenance of
Confidentiality: A Look at the Martin Marietta Decision, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 187, 187
(1990).
9
See Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122 (7th Cir. 1997) (allowing selective
waiver of a confidentiality agreement); United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1995)
(same); In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that if the government
agrees to maintain confidentiality, disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver); Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc); In re Leslie Fay Cos., Secs. Litig.,
161 F.R.D. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (using reasoning similar to Steinhardt);Jobin v. Bank of Boulder
(In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co.), 161 B.R. 689 (D. Colo. 1993) (finding steps to maintain confidentiality and motives for cooperation to be sufficient so as to maintain attorney-client privilege with
regard to letters and memoranda); Schnell v. Schnall, 550 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (closely
following Teachers Insurance); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broad. Co.,
521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that disclosure to the SEC constitutes a complete
waiver unless privilege is specifically reserved at the time of disclosure).
10
See Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 307; Genentech, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
122 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1997); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 684
(1st Cir. 1997); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1988); Permian Corp.
v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

1
See THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE JUSTICES' CASELOAD, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/justicecaseload.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2004) (noting that
plenary review and oral arguments are granted in only about 100 cases per term). Although a
judicial remedy may be unlikely, and Congress may subsequently abrogate any such judicial remDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004
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Part 1I of this Article discusses the contours of the attorney-client privilege and its companion, the work product doctrine, and their respective limitations. Part III outlines the division of federal appellate courts as to the validity
of the concept of selective waiver. Part IV contends that Congress should enact
legislation to address the uncertainty regarding selective waiver of attorneyclient privilege when turning over confidential documents to government investigators by creating a qualified limited waiver rule. Alternatively, the judiciary
could determine that limited waiver is applicable in instances where government
investigations are involved. Such legislative or judicial intervention would resolve the circuit split, providing certainty to litigants and an incentive for continuing self-regulation by corporations.
II.BACKGROUND
A.

The Attorney-Client Privilege

"The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the testimonial privileges
protecting confidential communications."' 12 Historically an attorney could assert
the privilege to prevent being required to take an oath and testify against his
client. The modern notion of the attorney-client privilege is that it is the client's
prerogative.1 3 The privilege essentially means that "there can be neither compelled nor voluntary disclosure by the attorney of matters conveyed to the attorney in confidence by a client for the purpose of seeking legal advice."' 4 The
rationale that underlies this doctrine is that an attorney can provide the best pro-5
fessional advice when the information is provided to him or her in confidence.'
edy, this Article will explore that possibility. See infra Part IV.
12 See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2. For a comprehensive discussion of both the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine, see 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 2017, 2021-28 (2d ed. 1994).
13

See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2; 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542-43 (McNaughton

rev. ed. 1961).
14 See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2-3.
15

See id; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (observing that the

purpose of the privilege is "to encourage clients to make full disclosures to their attorneys");
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1979) ("The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need
for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out."); In re Colton, 201 F. Supp 13, 15
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962) ("In the eighteenth century, when the desire
for truth overcame the wish to protect the honor of witnesses and several testimonial privileges
disappeared, the attorney-client privilege was retained, on the new theory that it was necessary to
encourage clients to make the fullest disclosures to their attorneys, to enable the latter to properly
advise the clients. This is the basis of the privilege today."); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) ("In a society as complicated in structure as ours and
governed by laws as complex and detailed as those imposed upon us, expert legal advice is essential. To the furnishing of such advice the fullest freedom and honesty of communication of perti-
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The attorney counsels the client as to the extent of the privilege and makes certain that privileged documents are not disclosed by accident.' Thus, by ensuring candor and facilitating effective legal representation, the attorney-client
privilege serves an integral role in the litigation process.
The limited waiver problem tests the boundaries of the attorney-client
privilege. Thus, examining the well-established definition of the attorney-client
privilege is crucial in understanding its limitations. Wigmore maintains that:
(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself
or by the legal advisor, (8) except the pro7
tection be waived.'
This multifactor test provides a guide for determining whether the attorneyclient privilege attaches.
It is commonly accepted that four elements are necessary to establish
the attorney-client privilege: "(1) a communication; (2) made between privileged persons; (3) in confidence; (4) for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or
providing legal assistance to the client."' 18 In addition, the privilege normally
cannot be waived; rather it must be affirmatively raised.' 9 There are several
ways in which the attorney-client privilege can be waived.20 Generally, if privileged information has been released into the public domain, either affirmatively
nent facts is a prerequisite. To induce clients to make such communications, the privilege to prevent their later disclosure is said by courts and commentators to be a necessity. The social good
derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is believed
to outweigh the harm that may come from the suppression of the evidence in specific cases.").
16
See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2-3.
17

See 8

WIGMORE,

supra note 13, at 554. The United Shoe decision also contains a multifac-

tor test:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become the client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication
relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i)
an opinion in law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
118 (Tentative Draft No. I, 1988).

18

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §

19

See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2.

20

For a review of actions and situations which constitute waiver, see id. at 292-302.
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or through some failure to safeguard, it is no longer confidential.2' Moreover, if
a client discloses part of a privileged communication, he or she cannot assert
privilege for the remainder of the communication, effectively waiving the privilege.2 2 The privilege may also be waived within the context of a judicial proceeding. When disclosure is required as part of such a proceeding, the modem
view is that evidence of the privileged matter is not admissible against the
holder if he or she did not have the opportunity to assert the privilege or if dis23
closure was compelled in error. In judicial proceedings, courts also look to see
whether an objection was made at the time discovery was compelled.24 Finally,
the privilege can be waived by inadvertent disclosure. With regard to inadvertent disclosure, courts have applied a variety of approaches, including strict
a gross negligence requirement for waiver, and a case-by-case balancing
waiver,
25
test.
The attorney-client privilege is deeply instilled in our legal system. Although the attorney-client privilege dates as far back as Roman times, its formulation in Elizabethan England is the closest to the doctrine in use today.26 On
many occasions, the Supreme Court has defined and reaffirmed the need for the
attorney-client privilege.27 It is "founded on upon the necessity, in the interest
and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law
and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily
availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure." 28 Furthermore, the American Bar Association has outlined contours of
21

See id. at 292; see also In re Kidder Peabody Secs. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 459, 468 (S.D.N.Y.

1996) (holding investigation notes which became part of a corporate report were not privileged).
22
See Tsai-Son Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1999); EPSTEIN, supra
note 7, at 296.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 297. Generally followed by the courts although not enacted,
23
Proposed Rule of Evidence 512 states: "Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged
matter is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if the disclosure was (a) compelled
erroneously or (b) made without opportunity to claim the privilege." GLEN WEISSENBERGER &
JAMES J.DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND

AUTHORITY 994 (2001).
24

See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 298.

25

See id. at 309-16.

26

GERGACZ, supra note 6, § 1.02, at 1-4.

27

See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("As a practical matter, if the

client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to
confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice."); Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). See generally Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential
Communications Between Lawyers and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 492 (1928) (debating
whether the attorney-client privilege promotes law-abiding behavior by clients).
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing
28
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S.464, 470 (1888)).
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the privilege in its Model Rules of Professional Conduct.2 9 In short, the attorney-client privilege is an integral part of the American legal system, promoting
justice and efficiency of the judicial process while protecting the relationship
between advocate and client. The possibility of waiving this privilege raises
complex and intriguing issues, particularly with regard to corporate clients.
B.

The Work Product Doctrine

A companion to the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine
encompasses materials used to prepare for litigation.30 Often, certain materials
may be covered by both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine; thus, the two doctrines overlap. However, given that each doctrine is
somewhat unique, each should be asserted separately. 31 Because the work product doctrine "may protect any document prepared in anticipation of litigation by
or for a party or his representative," its protection is potentially broader than the
attorney-client privilege. 32 However, the protection that the attorney-client
privilege affords is generally stronger than that provided by the work product
doctrine. 33 Lastly, if an opponent can demonstrate undue hardship, work product may be discovered, whereas the same showing
will never defeat the attor34
confidentiality.
of
promise
privilege's
ney-client

(2002) provides as follows:

29

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6

30

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as
stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;
or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
GERGACZ, supra note 6, § 7.01, at 7-4.

See id.; see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (observing that the work
product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege and that the traditional exceptions of one do not automatically apply to the other).
32
GERGACZ, supra note 6, § 7.01, at 7-3 (observing that the work product doctrine is broader
31

than and distinct from the attorney-client privilege).
33

See id.

34

See id.
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The work product doctrine first came to the fore in the seminal case of
Hickman v. Taylor.35 In Hickman, the petitioner sought to obtain memoranda
containing statements of fact from individuals who witnessed the sinking of a
tugboat on the Delaware River near Philadelphia. 36 Affirming the decision of
the Third Circuit, 37 the Supreme Court disallowed discovery of materials prepared by the opponent's counsel in anticipation of litigation. 38 The Court hl
held
that such protection of materials prepared by counsel could only be defeated by
a showing of good cause.39 In the years following Hickman, courts applied the
ruling on a case-by-case basis, often with conflicting results.40 In order to provide better clarity and uniformity, Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure was adopted in 1970.n' Rule 26(b)(3) was thus an attempt to recon4 2 and has effectively
cile Hickman and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
4
3
supplanted the holding in Hickman. The rule provides that an attorney can
never be compelled to disclose his or her mental impressions, conclusions, and
opinions, even given a showing of relevance, substantial need, or undue hardship. an
35
36

329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Id. at 498.

37

Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Third
Circuit reversed the district court, which required the defendants to answer certain interrogatories
or to face criminal contempt charges. See Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 153
F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945), afftd, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
38
See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 505.
39

See id.

See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 733 (4th
Cir. 1974).
41
The rule states:
40

(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or
for that other party's representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation
of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
See Duplan, 509 F.2d at 733.

42

43

See Seal v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 135 F.R.D. 113, 115 (W.D. Pa. 1990).

44

See Duplan, 509 F.2d at 734.
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Thus, the evolution of the work product doctrine has resulted in a standard which protects client confidences from subsequent revelation. As preparation for litigation may often involve issues of compliance with a government
regulatory body, possible waiver of the work product doctrine, as with the attorney-client privilege, raises thorny issues regarding third party access to confidential information.
C.

Disclosureof Privileged Communicationsand Documents to the
Government and the Selective Waiver Doctrine

Because the federal government has limited resources, broad enforcement of rules and laws is impossible. Faced with these constraints, and unable
to execute a widespread crackdown, government regulatory agencies must find
alternate methods to foster compliance. Voluntary disclosure programs are often part of the enforcement scheme of these agencies. 45 The disclosure of privileged documents to the government often arises within the context of the SEC's
Voluntary Disclosure Plan 46 or disclosure in response to a subpoena.4 7 The
Voluntary Disclosure Plan reduces the costs of enforcement and encourages
corporations to investigate possible violations and report them to the SEC.48 In
return for its cooperation, the corporation will not be subject to a civil enforcement action provided that it corrects all the violations discovered. 49 The Antitrust Division of the DOJ also has an immunity policy for corporations that voluntarily disclose illegal activity prior to the start of an investigation. 50 A clear
45

See generally William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution,Cooperation, and the Trading of
Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 647 n.20 (2002).

See generally In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(involving the SEC's voluntary disclosure plan); Raymond E. Watts, Jr., Comment, Reconciling

46

Voluntary Disclosure with the Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege: A Move Toward a Comprehensive Limited Waiver Doctrine, 39 MERCER L. REV. 1341 (1988) (advocating a qualified limited

waiver rule).
47

See GERGACZ, supra note 6, § 5.03[4], at 5-47.

48

See Watts, supra note 46, at 1346 n.47. See generally Beth S. Dorris, Note, The Limited

Waiver Rule: Creationof an SEC-CorporationPrivilege, 36 STAN. L. REV. 789, 804 (1984) (lim-

iting discussion to the SEC's Voluntary Disclosure Plan). The note argues that the limited waiver
rule should be abandoned:
The limited waiver rule does not concern the privilege between attorney and
client; rather, it implicitly creates a new privilege between corporations and
the SEC. This rule and the new privilege that it represents clash with government disclosure laws and reduce pressure on corporations to comply with securities laws. Furthermore, the new privilege is unnecessary because a healthy
flow of voluntary corporate disclosures to the SEC already exists.

Id. at 789.
49

See Watts, supra note 46, at 1341; see also Dorris, supra note 48, at 793-96.

50

See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, at
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public policy interest in the efficient administration of the law supports voluntary disclosure.5'
Opinions diverge when it comes to assessing the effects and consequences of waiver. For example, one perspective treats disclosure to the government as a disclosure to a third party, thus waiving any privilege. However,
this might hinder the public policy interest of the efficient administration of the
law. This conflict between protection of privilege and effective regulatory enforcement
constitutes part of the current division among federal appellate
52
courts.

III. SELECTIVE/LIMITED WAIVER ACROSS THE CIRCUITS
AND IN

A.

SEC INVESTIGATIONS

The Eighth Circuit's View
In Diversified Industries v. Meredith,53 the Eighth Circuit articulated the

view that voluntary disclosure to a government agency does not waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to other parties. Diversified and Weatherhead
had previously been engaged in the sale of large amounts of copper.5 4 In "proxy
fight" litigation, it was discovered that Diversified had maintained a "slush
fund" for improper purposes, such as bribing officials at Weatherhead.55 An
ensuing investigation resulted in disclosures by Diversified to the SEC. 56 In its
lawsuit against Diversified, Weatherhead alleged an illicit conspiracy to purchase inferior copper from Diversified and sought damages.57
On appeal, Diversified petitioned for a writ of mandamus 58 directed at
the Honorable James H. Meredith, Chief Judge for the United States District
Court in the Eastern District of Missouri. 59 The petition requested protection of
a memorandum and a report from discovery by its opponent, the Weatherhead
Company. 60 An SEC investigation had prompted the earlier production of the
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf (Aug. 10, 1993).
51
52

53
54

55

See

GERGACZ, supra note 6, § 5.03, at 5-47.
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.

572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
Id. at 607.

56

Id.
Id.

57

Id.

5s

See id. at 599 (explaining the use of mandamus as a means for obtaining immediate appellate review).
59
See id. at 598-99.
60

Id. at 599.
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documents in question. 6 ' The Washington, D.C. law firm of Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering prepared both reports for Diversified.62 Diversified also wanted to
protect corporate meeting minutes that discussed the memorandum and the report. 63 The district court ordered Diversified to disclose these materials; thereupon, Diversified appealed to the Eighth Circuit.64 The Eighth Circuit originally
granted Diversified's petition in part and denied it in part, ordering the district
court to stay its order compelling disclosure as to documents that the appellate
court found to be protected under the attorney-client privilege. 65 The case was
subsequently heard en banc.6 6
Citing Hickman, Diversified asserted that the documents were within
the scope of the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.67 In
contrast, Weatherhead contended that the attorney-client privilege was inapplicable and that once Diversified turned the materials over to the SEC, the privilege was effectively waived. 68
Writing for the panel, Judge Henley found that neither the memorandum
nor the report were entitled to protection.69 In the majority of the panel's view,
the issue of the memorandum was straightforward because it contained no confidential information.7 ° While it acknowledged the issue of the report to be
more complex, the court nonetheless failed to find it worthy of protection. In
short, the majority of the panel found that it was unreasonable to determine that
the report had been prepared in anticipation of litigation, as the work product
doctrine requires.7'
Because the materials were not found to be privileged, the panel did not
directly address the issue of waiver. 72 However, Judge Henley did express the
panel's view on this issue in dicta:

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64
65

Id.
Id. at 611.

66

Id. at 606.

67

Id. at 599.

68

Id.

69

See id. at 603. In the en banc decision, Judge Henley and Chief Judge Gibson filed separate

opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 611.
opinion. Id. at 617.
70

See id. at 603-04.

71

Id. at 604.

72

Id.
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We would be reluctant to hold that voluntary surrender of privileged material to a governmental agency in obedience to an
agency subpoena constitutes a waiver of the privilege for all
purposes, including its use in subsequent private litigation in
which the material is sought to be used against the party which
yielded it to the agency. 73
Furthermore, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Heaney agreed
that voluntary surrender of privileged material to the SEC did not constitute a
waiver of privilege.74 He also disagreed with the majority, asserting that the
attorney-client privilege was75indeed applicable to the memorandum prepared by
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.
The matter again came before the court - this time en banc. Upon rehearing, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the report, relevant portions of the
corporate minutes, and a letter were entitled to the attorney-client privilege.76 In
doing so, the court rejected the previously predominant "control group" test,
defining employee communications as a corporate client's communications
when the employee wields substantial decision-making power.77 Instead, citing
increasing criticism of the "control group" test, it adopted the test from Harper
& Row Publishers v. Decker,7 8 including employee communications as client
communications when the employee communicates at the direction of his or her
supervisors and the subject matter is within the scope of employment. 79 It further added requirements, set forth by noted Judge Jack B. Weinstein, designed
to limit potential abuse. 80
73

Id. at 604 n.I1.

Id. at 604 (Heaney, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Heaney cited a line of
cases which held "[a] waiver of privilege must occur in the same proceeding in which it is sought
to be invoked." Id.
74

75
76

Id. at 604-05.
Id. at 611.

Id. at 608 (citing City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.
Pa. 1962)).
78
423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
77

79
80

Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 608.
Id. at 609 (citing 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN

& MARGARET

A.

BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §

503(b)[04] (1975)). Thus, for the attorney-client privilege to be applicable to an employee's
communications, a corporation must show the following:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3)
the superior made the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the
subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because
of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.
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The court also held that disclosure of privileged material to the SEC
pursuant to a subpoena constituted a limited waiver of the privilege. 8 1 The court
observed that "[tlo hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and
customers. ,,81 Moreover, Judge Henley concurred with the majority opinion
written by Judge Heaney on this point.
In conclusion, the Eighth Circuit's
holding in Diversified Industries underscores the significant public policy interest in promoting self-regulation that supports a limited waiver rule.
B.

The View of the First, Third,Fourth, Sixth, Federaland District of Columbia Circuits
1.

United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The limited waiver issue came before the First Circuit in United States
v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology" within the context of an investigation
by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). In 1993, the IRS conducted an audit
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT") to determine whether
MIT still qualified for tax exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).85 The IRS
requested billing statements from the law firms that had previously represented
MIT as well as "minutes of the MIT Corporation and its executive and auditing
committees. 86 MIT complied but redacted certain portions of the requested
documents, citing the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.87
After MIT declined to supply the redacted information, the IRS attempted to
obtain the information from the auditing branch of the Department of Defense
("DOD"), to which MIT had submitted the information in its entirety in response to an audit with regard to contracts between MIT and the DOD.8 8 The
DOD 9essentially refused to provide the information without MIT's explicit con8
sent.

Id.
81

Id. at 611.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 612 (Henley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

84

129 F.3d 681 (lst Cir. 1997).

85

Id. at 682.

86

id.

87

Id. at 683.

88

Id.

89

Id.
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Massachusetts held that MIT's disclosure of its legal bills to the audit agency waived the
attorney-client privilege. 90 The court also ordered MIT to turn over the minutes
because it had substantially disclosed them in its legal bills. 9' However, the
district court did not directly address the waiver issue,
92 finding that the documents were discoverable as ordinary business records.
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part and vacated it in part.9 3 Finding no applicable federal constitutional provision, statutory provision, nor court rule to govern the case, the appellate court looked to
common law to determine the scope of the privilege. 94 It acknowledged that a
range of scenarios could be included under the category of "waiver," including
"situations as divergent as an express and voluntary surrender of the privilege,
partial disclosure of a privileged document, selective disclosure to some outsiders but not all, and inadvertent overhearings or disclosures. 95
After comparing the view of the Eighth Circuit with that of the Second,
Third, Fourth, Federal, and District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit") Circuits, the
court declined to adopt the Eighth Circuit's position:
[T]he general principle that disclosure normally negates the
privilege is worth maintaining. To maintain it here makes the
law more predictable and certainly eases its administration.
Following the Eighth Circuit's approach would require, at the
very least, a new set of difficult line-drawing exercises that
would consume time and increase uncertainty.96
Writing for the court, Judge Boudin found that although a client's "intent to
maintain confidentiality is ordinarily necessary to continued protection," it was
insufficient in this instance.97 MIT forfeited the privilege when it disclosed the
information to the audit agency; therefore, MIT could not refuse to comply with
the IRS's request for the same information.98

90

See United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 957 F. Supp. 301, 306 (E.D. Mass.), aff'd in part,

vacated in part, 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997).
91

See id. at 305.

92

See id.

93

Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d at 688.

94

Id. at 684.

95

Id. (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 93, at 341-48 (J.W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)).

96

id. at 685.

97

Id. at 684-85.

98

Id.
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The court also acknowledged an important distinction between the work
product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege:
[W]ork product protection is not as easily waived as the attorney-client privilege. The privilege, it is said, is designed to protect confidentiality, so that any disclosure outside the magic circle is inconsistent with the privilege; by contrast, work product
protection is provided against "adversaries," so only disclosing
material in a way inconsistent with keeping it from an adversary
waives work product protection.99
Boudin found that MIT's disclosure to the audit agency was "a disclosure to a
potential adversary" because the possibility for litigation clearly existed.' °° For
this reason, MIT forfeited protection of the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. In reaching its conclusion, the First Circuit favored adherence to the clarity of the existing rules rather than abandoning them in favor of a
still-amorphous limited waiver doctrine.
2.

Genentech, Inc. v. United States InternationalTrade
Commission

The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine in a prior ongoing lawsuit in Genentech,
Inc. v. United States InternationalTrade Commission.'°' In 1993, Genentech
filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission ("ITC") seeking an
investigation based on an alleged infringement of four of its patents relating to
recombinant production of human growth hormone by its competitors. °2 At the
same time, Genentech was suing other competitors (Eli Lilly and the Regents of
the University of California) in Indiana for patent infringement. 10 3 In that lawsuit, Genentech inadvertently produced some 12,000 pages of documents it considered to be privileged under either the work product doctrine or the attorneyclient privilege. 1°4 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana ruled that Genentech had waived its privilege with respect to those
documents. 0 5 Following this ruling, Genentech's opponents in the ITC proceeding immediately requested disclosure of the documents.' 6
99

Id. at 687.

1oo Id.

lot
02

103

122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Id. at 1412.
Id.
Id. at 1413.
S4

105

See In re Recombinant DNA Tech. Patent and Contract Litig., 850 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Ind.
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Chief Judge Archer disagreed with Genentech's view that the waiver of
a privilege should be limited to the proceeding in the district court.' °7 Indeed,
the court recognized that it had never subscribed to the limited waiver theory
advanced by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. 0 8 Finding that Genentech's document screening procedures were inadequate and that Genentech had not made
"'best efforts' to maintain the confidentiality of the documents," the court held
that the waiver was general and could be asserted in the ITC proceeding.1°9
Using reasoning similar to that of the First Circuit in the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology case, the Federal Circuit relied on the relative certainty that general waiver offers in reaching its decision to reject limited waiver. Thus, the
Federal Circuit declined to adopt the limited waiver theory, instead adhering to a
general waiver approach.
3.

Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of Philippines

The Third Circuit took up the limited waiver issue in Westinghouse
0 The
Electric Corp. v. Republic of Philippines."1
Republic of the Philippines
("Philippines") alleged that Westinghouse had obtained a power plant contract
by bribing a government official and thereby tortiously interfering with the fiduciary relationship between President Ferndinand Marcos and the Philippine people."' The Philippines therefore sought to recover damages from Westinghouse," 2 alleging that Westinghouse had retained Herminio Disini, a friend of
Marcos, to promote its interests with its National Power Company." 13 Through
discovery, the Philippines sought documents that Westinghouse had provided to
the SEC in conjunction with an investigation.' "4 Kirkland & Ellis, counsel to
Westinghouse at the time of the investigation, provided letters to the SEC detailing the results of the investigation but did not supply any of the supporting
documents.' '5 Westinghouse asserted that it had a "reasonable expectation of
1994).
106

Genentech, 122 F.3d at 1413.

107

Id. at 1416-17.

108

Id. at 1417.

109

Id. at 1418.

110

951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).

I ld. at 1417. David Boies, formerly of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, and more recently involved in the Microsoft antitrust litigation and the 2000 presidential election controversy, represented Westinghouse in the litigation. Id.
112
Id.
113 Id. at 1418.
114 ld. at 1417.
115 ld. at

1418.
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continuing confidentiality for the materials shown to the SEC" based on the
SEC's own confidentiality
provisions and the Eighth Circuit's holding in Diver6
sified Industries. 1
The same documents were subsequently disclosed to the DOJ as part of
that agency's investigation of Westinghouse's use of illegal bribes for contracts
in the Philippines and other countries.' 7 Westinghouse finally disclosed the8
documents to the DOJ only after entering into a confidentiality agreement."
Under the terms of this agreement, the documents would not be viewed by anyone outside the DOJ and the disclosure would not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine." 9 In spite of this agreement, the district court in New Jersey found that these disclosures constituted
a
20
waiver of the attomey-client privilege and the work product doctrine.
The Third Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, rejecting the selec2
tive waiver approach in Diversified Industries.1
1 Writing for the court, Judge
Becker agreed with the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Permian Corp. v. United
States that a selective waiver rule does not "serve the purpose of encouraging
full disclosure to one's attorney."'' 22 Instead, it only encourages disclosure to
government agencies - an objective that is "laudable" but beyond the intended
purposes of the attorney-client privilege.1 23 Essentially, the court was reluctant
to grant what it deemed to be an entirely new privilege. Reasoning that the disclosures to the SEC and the DOJ were not made in furtherance of the purposes
of the doctrine, it held that the work product doctrine was waived against all
other adversaries.124 Rejecting the widely asserted rationale for limited waiver
and contending that limited waiver exceeds the bounds of the attorney-client
privilege itself, the Third Circuit declined to follow the Eighth Circuit on this
issue.
4.

In re Martin Marietta Corp.

William Pollard, a former employee of defense contractor Martin Marietta, was accused of government fraud and mail fraud with regard to overstating
116

Id.

117

ld. at 1419.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Republic of Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 132 F.R.D. 384, 391 (D.N.J. 1990), manda-

mus denied, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).
121
See supra notes 53-83 and accompanying text.
122

Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425. For a discussion of Permian Corp. v. United States, 665

F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981), see infra Part 11I.B.5.
123
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425.
124

id. at 1429.
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travel costs when requesting reimbursement by the DOD.125 Through discovery,
Pollard sought Martin Marietta documents pertaining to audit papers, witness
statements, and administrative settlement agreements.126 Martin Marietta argued, inter alia, that the documents in question were protected by the attorneyclient privilege and the work product doctrine. 27 In turn, Pollard argued that
Martin Marietta had impliedly waived the privilege when it disclosed the documents to the United States Attorney and the DOD in conjunction with a settlement agreement.
The Fourth Circuit examined the limited waiver rule closely in the context of both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The
court noted policy concerns that militate in favor of an implied limited waiver
rule, including "facilitating settlement of litigation, permitting full cooperation
among joint defendants, expediting discovery and encouraging voluntary disclosure to regulatory agencies."' 128 In keeping with previously held views of the
Fourth Circuit, 29 the court rejected the limited waiver concept with regard to the
attorney-client privilege and non-opinion work product; it upheld limited waiver
with regard to opinion work product. 130 Therefore, attempts to use work product
materials for purposes of testimony, including a position paper submitted to the
government on why Martin Marietta should not be prosecuted and its underlying
witness statements, would constitute a waiver. 13 1 In so finding, the court looked
to three key factors:
First, we note that the federal government's and Martin Marietta's interests were decidedly adverse during the proceedings at
issue. Martin Marietta faced criminal charges in the one instance and debarment from federal contracting in the other. We
do not decide the issue of disclosures in less adverse circumstances like regulatory disclosures. Second, we note that Martin
Marietta made an express assurance of completeness of its disclosure to the United States Attorney. Third, we note that the
125

In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 620 (4th Cir. 1988).

126

Id. at 621.

127
Id. at 622. See generally Breckinridge L. Willcox, Martin Marietta and the Erosion of the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, 49 MD. L. REV. 917, 922 (1990) (distinguishing between partial waiver, "the strategic disclosure of a subset of a larger class of privileged
or protected material," and selective waiver, "a purposeful disclosure to a third person by a party
who continues to assert privilege or protection as to all others").
128 Martin Marietta, 856 F.2d at 623.
129 See In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185, 1186 (4th Cir. 1979). But cf Diversified Indus. v. Mere-

dith, 572 F.2d 596, 606 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
130
Martin Marietta, 856 F.2d at 623.
131 Id. at 624; see United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1222-23 (4th Cir. 1976).
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disclosures were made in a direct attempt to settle active controversies between Martin Marietta and the United States Attorney and the DOD. Not only was there not community of interest, the disclosures were made under
promise of completeness
32
to induce an adversary to settle.'
According greater protection to opinion work product, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to
conduct an in camera review of documents for which work product protection
was claimed. 33 Thus, the court drew a more difficult distinction between types
of work product protection in its partial adoption of the limited waiver rule.
5.

PermianCorp. v. United States

In Permian Corp. v. United States,'34 the district court issued a permanent injunction to bar the SEC from disclosing Permian Corporation's documents to the United States Department of Energy. District Judge Parker upheld
the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, holding that disclosure
35
of these documents to the SEC did not constitute a waiver of the privileges.
On appeal, the government argued that the privileges had been waived.
Applying the "clearly erroneous" standard, 36 the D.C. Circuit upheld
the district court's rejection of the government's assertion that Occidental, Permian's parent corporation, "clearly and intentionally waived its privilege claims
vis-A-vis government agencies.' '
The court thus upheld the work product
38
of the thirty-six documents in question.1
twenty-nine
to
regard
with
privilege
However, it also concluded that Occidental had waived protection of all of the
thirty-six documents under the attorney-client privilege. 39 Judge Mikva characterized Occidental's request to apply the limited waiver doctrine as "wholly
unpersuasive. '' 4° He did not believe that application of limited waiver would
facilitate communication between attorney and client:

1.32

Martin Marietta, 856 F.2d at 625.

1.3

Id. at 626.

13

No. 79-2098, 1980 WL 1075, at *11 (D.D.C. May 15, 1980), affid in part, rev'd in part,
665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
13.5 Id. at *10.
136

See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(c).

137
138

Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1222.

139

Id.

Id. at 1220.
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Voluntary cooperation with government investigations may be a
laudable activity, but it is hard to understand how such conduct
improves the attorney-client relationship. If the client feels the
need to keep his communications with his attorney confidential,
he is free to do so under the traditional rule by consistently asserting the privilege, even when the discovery request comes
from a "friendly" agency .... The client cannot be permitted to
pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for
some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to obstruct
others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose
confidentiality
he has already compromised for his own bene14 1
fit.

The D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the district court for it to determine the privileged status of the other seven documents. 42 Subsequent cases in
the D.C. Circuit followed the Permian court's decision. 43 Thus, just as Judge
Mikva was not swayed by the limited waiver argument in Permian, courts in
this circuit subsequently addressing the issue have not recognized limited
waiver.
6.

In re ColumbiaHCA HealthcareCorp., Billing Practices
Litigation

As discussed at the outset of this Article, 44 the plaintiffs, suing Columbia/HCA for over-billing, sought to compel the production of documents that
Columbia/HCA had furnished to the DOJ in conjunction with the prior investigation.145 The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
granted this request. 46 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision, holding that Columbia/HCA could not use the selective waiver doctrine and that its waiver of attorney-client privilege constituted a waiver of the
47
work product doctrine. 1
141

Id. at 1221.

142

Id. at 1222.

143

See In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Sealed Case, 676

F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
144
See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
145
In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., Billing Practices Litigation, 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir.
2002), cert. dismissed sub nom. HCA, Inc. v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 124 S. Ct.
27 (2003).
146
In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., Billing Practices Litig., 192 F.R.D. 575, 580 (M.D.
Tenn. 2000), aff'd, 293 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2002), cert dismissed sub noma. HCA, Inc. v. Tenn.
Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 124 S. Ct. 27 (2003).
147
Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 289.
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The Sixth Circuit took a comprehensive survey of "selective," or limited
waiver, caselaw, policy concerns, and potential ramifications of a limited waiver
rule before concluding that it could not adopt one.148 The court identified three
possible scenarios: selective waiver is permissible, selective waiver is not permissible, or selective waiver is permissible if the government agrees to a confidentiality order. 149 After thoroughly analyzing the aforementioned body of
caselaw, the court declined to adopt the selective waiver theory. Judge Russell
observed that "[t]he attorney-client privilege was never designed to protect conversations between a client and the Government - i.e., an adverse party - rather,
it pertains only to conversations between the client and his or her attorney."' 5 °
Instead of fostering frankness between attorney and client, adoption of selective
waiver would merely serve as a tool for strategic advantage - a tactic of waiving
or invoking privilege when it best suits the client. 15' The court also noted that
the attorney-client privilege is a common law right, "not a creature of contract,
arranged between parties to suit the whim of the moment."' 52 If the invocation
of privilege occurred on a case-by-case or opponent-by-opponent basis, the facilitation of government cooperation would be a never-ending argument, resulting in a "difficult and fretful linedrawing process ...consuming immeasurable
private and judicial resources in a vain attempt to distinguish one private litigant
from the next."1 53 Noting that selective waiver could be construed as facilitating
obfuscation, Judge Russell observed that government investigatory agencies
"should act to bring to light illegal activities, not to assist wrongdoers in concealing the information from the public domain."'' 54 The court reached this
55
same conclusion with regard to selective waiver of the work product doctrine.'
In the dissent, Judge Boggs suggested that by exposing an entity to liability with respect to all parties, the majority's decision "unnecessarily raises
the cost of cooperating with a government investigation.' 5 6 Arguing that easing
the burden on the government in conducting investigations is as important as
upholding the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, Boggs suggested a bright-line rule allowing selective waiver to a government agency:

148

Id. at 295-302.

149

Id.

1.o Id. at 302.
152

See id. at 302-03.
Id. at 303.

153

Id.

15

Id.

155

Id. at 307.

156

Id. at 307 (Boggs, J., dissenting).

11
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[A] problem with the rule-like features of the exception is that
the exception may have limited efficacy absent uniformity
among the courts. It would be difficult to remove the disincentive to cooperate with the government if the protection from
waiver depended on the circuit in which a party would be eventually involved in litigation. The mere split between our sister
circuits should not dissuade us from adopting the exception.
This court should follow the legal position that it finds most
meritorious and leave the problem of uniformity to a higher
court. 57
In short, the dissent believed that "Columbia intended to preserve both
the attorney-client and the attorney-work-product privileges and that a limited
disclosure pursuant to a government agency's investigatory request ought not to
waive the privileges as to all other parties."' 58 Recognizing an important public
policy interest in facilitating cooperation with the government, Judge Boggs
advocated the adoption of a limited waiver rule in spite of a predominantly opposing view in the federal circuits. The Columbia/HCA decision provides the
most thorough analysis of the limited waiver issue to date. It sets the stage for
the legislative and judicial remedies advocated in Part IV.
C.

Waiver in the Context of SEC Investigations

Created in 1934 following the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 59
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,160 the SEC maintains as its primary
goals the protection of investors and the maintenance of integrity in the securities markets.'16 Its Enforcement Division targets violations of securities laws,
recommends action in federal court or before an administrative law judge, and
negotiates settlements.162 Because corporations are faced with a "vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation," they frequently utilize legal counsel to
ensure compliance. 63 Conducting an internal investigation can fulfill the legal
duty to investigate, preempt a government investigation, meet public expecta157

ld. at 314.

158

Id.

159 Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000)).
160 Pub. L. No. 73-291,48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
161 See U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM., THE INVESTOR'S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS
MARKET INTEGRITY, at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
(last modified July 21, 2003) (providing a broad overview of the structure and function of the
SEC).
162 See id.
INVESTORS AND MAINTAINS

163

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
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tions, enable a corporation to act knowledgably and proactively, and mitigate a
sentence if conviction occurs.' 64 Thus, corporations have become increasingly
inclined, albeit cautiously, to conduct internal investigations. 65 The results of
these investigations become a source of controversy once they are handed over
to the government.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of waiver in the context of an
SEC investigation in Upjohn Co. v. United States.166 Upjohn, a pharmaceutical
manufacturer, had initiated an internal investigation of suspect payments by its
foreign subsidiaries. 167 The company's general counsel subsequently submitted
a report regarding these payments to both the SEC and the IRS. 168 When the
IRS demanded production of the supporting documents, Upjohn refused, citing
the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. 69 In Upjohn, after
the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan issued an
order enforcing the IRS's summons for documents, the Sixth Circuit affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded the case. 7 ° The Sixth Circuit found that
there had been no waiver of the attorney-client71 privilege, but that under the
"control group" test, the privilege did not apply.
In an opinion written by then Associate Justice Rehnquist, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's holding and remanded the case. 72 Noting that the
communications were "considered 'highly confidential' when made," and were
"kept confidential by the company," Justice Rehnquist recognized that protecting the communications from compelled disclosure was consistent with the "underlying purposes" of the privilege. 73 Further, he deemed that the privilege
"only protects the disclosure of communications," not the disclosure of underlying facts. 7 4 The Court also found that the work product doctrine did apply to
IRS summonses. 75 Although the majority declined to articulate a bright-line
rule regarding the applicability of privilege, Chief Justice Burger believed that
164

See Paul H. Dawes, Corporate Investigations, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1994, at 491, 496

(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. H4-5196, 1994).
165

See id. at 49 1.

166

449 U.S. at 383.

167

Id. at 386.

169

Id. at 387.
Id. at 388.

170

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1223, 1228 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383

168

(1981).
171

Id.

172

Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402.

173

Id. at 395.

174

Id.

175

Id. at 401-02.
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the articulation of such a standard 76would provide the guidance that corporations
and lower federal courts required.
Through broad view of the attorney-client privilege adopted in Upjohn,
the Court recognized the importance of internal investigations by corporations. 7 7 However, because the chief focus of both the Supreme Court and the
Sixth Circuit was on the confidentiality of the communications rather than the
issue of waiver, and because the Supreme Court did not offer much guidance for
applying the newly expanded attorney-corporate-client privilege,78 differences of
opinion among the federal circuits on the waiver issue persisted.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL OR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND PROVIDE CERTAINTY TO LITIGANTS

The dilemma discussed in the preceding section outlines the competing
interests and rationales for either adopting or rejecting a selective or partial
waiver rule. The "hopeless confusion"' 79 with which the courts continue to be
faced requires clarity and proper incentives for the parties involved: protecting
the basic rights of litigants in formal judicial proceedings while maintaining an
incentive to cooperate with government investigations. 80 Recognition of a public interest in facilitating this cooperation with the government is integral to understanding the rationale for adopting the limited waiver exception. Two possible solutions are a legislative resolution, which would define the contours of the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine in the special context of
a government agency investigation, and a judicial remedy, where courts would
recognize a limited waiver exception to the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine on a case-by-case basis.
The hesitancy of courts to adopt a limited waiver rule can be attributed
to the view that such a rule creates an entirely new privilege, rather than expanding the current one.' 8' Moreover, the need for such a rule is arguable, given the
current protection offered by the attorney-client privilege and the protections
offered by government agencies.18 2 However, the lack of true adversarial status
between corporations and investigating government agencies, the tremendous
176 Id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
177

See Watts, supra note 46, at 1342.

178 Id. at 1344.
179 GERGACZ, supra note 6, § 5.03[4][c], at 5-53.
180

See generally Stephen Robert Geisler, Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Violations of

Federal Law, 51 ALA. L. REV. 375, 384-86 (1999).

181 See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289,
302-04 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed sub nom. HCA, Inc. v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare
Fund, 124 S. Ct. 27 (2003).
182 See Dorris, supra note 48, at 789.
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costs saved, and the deterrent effect enjoyed by the government strongly support
the admittedly daunting task of creating and adopting a viable limited waiver
rule. By intervening, Congress could create a bright-line rule and lend a modicum of certainty to both government investigators and would-be defendants.
A.

A Possible Model Solution: Pierce County v. Guillen

In a parallel context, the Supreme Court's recent holding in Pierce
County v. Guillen'83 offers a template for solving the issue of waiver within the
context of the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The case
contains elements of both a legislative and a judicial solution. In Guillen, the
84
Court addressed Congressional measures enacted to improve highway safety.
Specifically, the Hazard Elimination Program' 85 called upon states and local
governments to evaluate public roads in order to "identify hazardous locations,
86
sections, and elements . . . which may constitute a danger to motorists."'
States objected to this measure because it did not provide for confidentiality of
disclosures, thus exposing them to liability for accidents occurring at the identified locations before repairs took place. 87 In response to these concerns, Congress enacted 23 U.S.C. § 409, which88prevented such data from being entered
into evidence in federal or state court.
Lower courts disagreed as to the meaning of section 409.189 Some argued that section 409 encompassed pretrial discovery, while others maintained
that it only protected materials "actually generated by a governmental agency

183

537 U.S. 129 (2003).

184

Id. at 133.

185

23 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).

186

Id. § 152(a)(1).

187

Guillen, 537 U.S. at 134.
The statute provided in pertinent part:

188

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys, schedules, lists,
or data compiled for the purpose of identifying, evaluating, or planning the
safety enhancement of potential accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions,
or railway-highway crossings, pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 152 of this
title or for the purpose of developing any highway safety construction improvement project which may be implemented utilizing Federal-aid highway
funds shall not be admitted into evidence in Federal or State court or considered for other purposes in any action for damages arising from any occurrence
at a location mentioned or addressed in such reports, surveys, schedules, lists
or data.
Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 § 132, 23 U.S.C. § 409
(1988) (current version at 23 U.S.C. § 409 (2000)).
189
Guillen, 537 U.S. at 134-35.
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for § 152 purposes," thus allowing discovery of compiled information. 190
Amendments to section 409 in 1991 and 1995 foreclosed the possibility of access to such information in pretrial discovery and expressly prohibited the use of
"compiled or collected" data.' 9 ' The plaintiff in Guillen challenged the state's
refusal to disclose the data under the State's Public Disclosure Act and sought
an order to compel in a separate action. 92 The Washington Supreme Court
found that section 409 violated the Commerce193Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause of the United States Constitution.
Addressing the scope of section 409, the Supreme Court adopted the
United States' interpretation of the statute, namely that it
protects all reports, surveys, schedules, lists or data actually
compiled or collected for § 152 purposes, but does not protect
information that was originally compiled or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152 and that is currently held by the agencies that compiled or collected it, even if the information was at
some point "collected" by another agency for § 152 purposes.' 94
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas noted that because section 409 establishes
an evidentiary privilege, it must be construed narrowly.1 95 Justice Thomas further observed that the revision of section 409 "would result in more diligent
efforts to collect the relevant information, more candid discussions of hazardous
locations, better informed decision making, and ultimately, greater safety on our
Nation's roads."' 196 While finding that the statute did not violate the Commerce

190

Id.

191

The amended statute states as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys, schedules, lists,
or data compiled or collected for the purpose of identifying, evaluating, or
planning the safety enhancement of potential accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or railway-highway crossings, pursuant to sections 130, 144,
and 152 of this title or for the purpose of developing any highway safety construction improvement project which may be implemented utilizing Federalaid highway funds shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence
in Federal or State court or considered for other purposes in any action for
damages arising from any occurrence at a location mentioned or addressed in
such reports, surveys, schedules, lists or data.
23 U.S.C. § 409 (2000) (emphasis added).
192 Guillen, 537 U.S. at 136-37.
193

Id. at 139.

194

Id. at 144.

195

Id.
id. at 147.

196
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was proper under
Clause, the Court did not reach the issue of whether the statute
197
the Spending Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause.
In summary, the Guillen decision indicates that Congress could reasonably enact a statutory provision preventing materials provided to a government agency in an investigation from being discoverable or entered into evidence. The provisions and rationale of the highway safety statutes, discussed
above, provide a solid foundation on which to base this proposed statute. They
also highlight the need for explicit and lucid statutory construction.
1.

Requirements of a Proposed Statutory Scheme

It is necessary to outline the parameters of any proposed statute aimed at
addressing the limited waiver issue. The statute must address which government investigations are covered. In addition, the types of privilege covered attorney-client, opinion work product, non-opinion work product - must be
specified. The statute must articulate which types of proceedings - civil, criminal, prior, and subsequent - are precluded from using the materials in question.
Such specificity will prevent opponents in ancillary litigation from gaining an
unfair advantage in those proceedings based on the candid disclosures of the
corporation to the government as part of an investigation.
2.

Potential Freedom of Information Act Issues

As one commentator has noted, 98 a limited waiver statute may conflict
with the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA").1 99 While information must be
in the possession of the government to be obtainable under FOIA, 200 shareholders may also be entitled to obtain such information in pursuit of a shareholder
derivative suit. 20 ' Limited waiver could allow corporations to use disclosure
197
198

Id.
See Dorris, supra note 48, at 806-13.

199

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). FOIA provides:

(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available
for public inspection and copying (D) copies of all records, regardless of form or format, which have been
released to any person under paragraph (3) and which, because of the nature of their subject matter, the agency determines have become or are
likely to become the subject of subsequent requests for substantially the
same records; and
(E) a general index of the records referred to under subparagraph (D).
Id. § 552(a)(2)(D)-(E). Some states also have statutes similar to FOIA. See, e.g., Guillen, 537
U.S. at 137 n.2 (outlining Washington's statute).
200
See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 182-86 (1980).
201

See Stephen F. Black & Robert M. Pozin, Internal Corporate Investigations, 20 Bus. L.

Monographs (MB) § 6.05 (1994).
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under the statute to protect certain incriminating information from ever being
used against them. The careful drafting of the statute would have to consider
these potential implications. By recognizing these difficulties, Congress could
avoid ambiguities, and ultimately, the need - as seen in the Guillen case - for
statutory amendments. In summary, the Supreme Court's holding in Guillen
offers guidance for a statutory resolution to the limited waiver issue as well as
some reassurance that such a statute is likely to be deemed constitutional by the
Supreme Court.
B.

The Alternative: A Judicial Remedy

A judicial remedy is certainly worthy of consideration. Although a legislative statute might be preferable because of its explicit nature, many such
20 2
proposals have failed to emerge from Congressional subcommittees alive.
Such proposals may have failed due to the intricacies of potential conflicts with
existing law, unintended consequences and incentives, and difficulties of interpretation. By adopting a qualified limited waiver rule, the Supreme Court can
put an end to the current state of disarray.20 3
If the Supreme Court decides to hear a case involving limited waiver, it
can resolve the current split in the circuits by either embracing or rejecting the
doctrine.
One commentator has argued that the Court could rely on its decision in Upjohn and find that a limited waiver rule would be appropriate. 20 5 Such
an approach would avoid "cooperation being bought at the price of . . .[the]
attorney-client privilege. ' '20 6 As Judge Boggs persuasively argued in the Columbia/HCA dissent, uniformity in the federal circuits is essential to providing
an incentive for corporations to cooperate with the government. 2°7 Further, an
imbalance in circuit opinions favoring abolition of the limited waiver
20 8 rule
should not prevent the Court from reaching a solution that has true merit.
No solution is perfect, and the judicial remedy is no exception. It would
be remiss to omit a discussion of the shortcomings of any judicial resolution.
First, it can be argued that if clients divulge information to third parties, they
would have also disclosed it to their attorneys without the protection of privilege. 2 09 This willingness to step outside the bounds of the attorney-client privi202

See generally Watts, supra note 46, at 135 I.

203

See id.

204

See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).

205

See Watts, supra note 46, at 1350-51.

206

Id. at 1352.

207

See 293 F.3d 289, 308 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J.,dissenting), cert. dismissed sub nom.

HCA, Inc. v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 124 S. Ct. 27 (2003).
208

See id.

209

See Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client
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lege critically weakens any subsequent argument to assert the privilege. To take
this argument one step further, it would seem that there is no justification for a
limited waiver.21 ° In addition to attacking the lack of grounds for granting a
limited waiver, critics could emphasize the huge tactical advantage that such a
rule would afford corporate America. Noting that "corporate counsel will be
forever grateful," one commentator contends that favoring corporations in this
manner surpasses the original intent of the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine. 21 Realistically, there will always be some measure of conflict
between government regulatory bodies and corporations. Perhaps the best synergy between these competing interests can be achieved if the proposed statutory solution is implemented to guide judicial analysis and thus better define the
boundaries of privilege.
C.

Criticism of ProposedRemedies and the Last Word

The remedies advocated herein are not without opposition. Indeed,
some have argued for the abandonment of the limited waiver rule. The SEC
corporation privilege recognized by the courts has been described as a "judicial
inroad on the Congressional policy of open government and free information. 21 2 Opponents to the limited privilege rule also cite the previously discussed FOIA problems in support of their argument. 1 3 Furthermore, any expanded privilege may ultimately undermine the enforcement of securities laws
by unduly protecting the SEC and "prevent[ing] disclosure of valuable information to private litigants, grand juries, and agencies other than the SEC bringing
enforcement actions of their own. 21 4 In addition, since voluntary compliance
with SEC investigations has already been achieved, it may not be necessary to
provide a privilege to foster compliance. 215 Thus, opponents of the limited
waiver rule contend that such burdens outweigh any possible benefits from its
adoption.21 6 In spite of these arguments, this Article submits that the policy
justifications, resulting clarity and fairness to parties, and overall benefit that
adoption of the rule offers outweigh the assertions of detractors. Enhanced levels of compliance with governmental agencies would enable them to allocate
their resources toward solving the most difficult and complicated issues in their
Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1207 (1982).
210

See id.

211

See Watts, supra note 46, at 1352.

212

Dorris, supra note 48, at 823.

213

See id.

214

Id.

215

See id.

216

See id. at 824.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 106, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106

respective areas of expertise. The scope of protection provided to corporations
to reward their forthrightness would be substantial enough to encourage such
cooperation, but not overly broad so that they receive unfair safeguards. If
properly implemented, adoption of a limited waiver rule would create a win-win
scenario for all sides.
V. CONCLUSION

Little guidance in the form of legal scholarship or statutory texts is
available to address the problem of waiver of the attorney-client privilege in the
context of a government investigation. Several federal circuits have encountered the question and have issued diverging opinions as to whether the privilege
is waived entirely once confidentiality has been breached. The circuits have
abstained from joining the Eighth Circuit's adoption of a limited waiver rule as
articulated in Diversified Industries. This hesitancy disserves the government,
corporations, and the public in general, as it perpetuates confusion among interested parties and blurs the incentives and interests. Because the waiver of privilege arises frequently in investigations of alleged improper dealings of a corporation, the17issue is particularly timely in the wake of recent myriad corporate
2
scandals.
There is a clear public interest in encouraging self-policing by corporations, one that is on par with that of the attorney-client privilege itself. By
promulgating a rule that establishes a limited waiver of the privilege in the context of government investigations, Congress can prevent manipulation of the
privilege and provide a bright-line rule to courts, government investigators and
potential defendants. With a statute in place, the Supreme Court will be able to
resolve the circuit split that currently exists. In the alternative, judicial recognition of a limited waiver rule carved out of the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine would resolve the split while maintaining a case-by-case
analysis. The need for an answer to this problem has never been greater.

217

See John Cassidy, The Greed Cycle: How the FinancialSystem Encouraged Corporations

to Go Crazy, NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 64-77 (examining the recent demise of Enron,
WorldCom, and several other major corporations).
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